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All is possible, but all is in doubt. All
things have lost their concert. In the
very dawn of his humanist affirmation,
the individual is assailed by the very
doubts, the very criticisms, the very ques
tioning with which Copernicus and
Galileo set free the dormant forces of the
universe, expanding it to a
that the dwarfed individual, in response,
must gigantically display his unleashed
passions, his unbridled pride, the cruel
uses of his political power, the Utopian
dream of a new city of the sun, the
hunger for a new human space with
which to confront the new, mute space of
the universe.
—Carlos Fuentes

In 1610 Galileo fascinated and shocked Europe with
the publication in The Starry Messenger of the obser
vations he made using the telescope. The conse
quences of this small volume were more far-ranging
than probably even Galileo anticipated. While his
claims about new stars and new satellites
of
considerable interest in scientific circles,
book
also altered not just what people knew but how they
knew it. In her classic treatment of this subject, Mar
jorie Nicolson argues that of all the developments
associated with the “New Science” it was the tele
scope that most profoundly changed how people
understood the world (“Telescope” 234-5). Although
Galileo's Starry Messenger
be a somewhat unusu-
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al case, its example nonetheless represents a significant conflict between read
ing and observation as ways of acquiring knowledge. Galileo’s text reveals the
extent to which many of the new methods of science depended increasingly on
observation rather than on textual authority. Thus, Galileo documents his
findings through illustration and description, rather than through a textual
authority such as Ptolemy. Moreover, transforming telescopic vision to textual
representation is the only means
which Galileo
share his findings since
he obviously cannot furnish the reader with a telescope. Reading therefore
becomes the medium through which the instrument of the telescope initially
becomes known. If what is seen through the telescope is inevitably not the
same when seen on the page, then neither is what is seen on the page the same
when read through the cultural changes produced by the telescope.
A well known incident in Part II of Don Quixote (1614), published four
years after The Starry Messenger, exemplifies the tension between reading and
observation produced by the invention of the telescope. Without considering
the possible impact that the telescope may have had on Cervantes’ conception
of Don Quixote, Edward Dudley
recently argued that Cervantes confronts
through Quixote a world full of “new modes of knowing” such that the novel
“becomes a response to the questions that the New Science posed about the
possibilities of knowing” (2).1 As a text that theorizes more rigorously perhaps
than any other how reading changes the
you see, Don Quixote explores in
the adventure with Clavileño how the telescope alters what you see. This
episode can be understood as a fantasy that enacts the conflict that the new
ways of seeing exemplified by the telescope brought to older practices of read
ing. Although Sancho, being illiterate, is of course one of the remarkably few
characters in Quixote who is not a reader, it is on this fact that the episode with
Clavileño turns. In this adventure, Sancho Panza
what he thinks is a voy
age into space on the magical wooden horse Clavileño. As if he were using a
telescope, Sancho’s simulated ride on the horse becomes the means by which he
is able to explore starry distances without ever leaving the ground. As someone
who insists that what he sees is true, Sancho becomes a
here for philoso
phers of the New Science who wanted to rely not on texts but instead on per
sonal observation as a means of learning the truth about the world. Himself
not a follower of textual authority, Sancho thus aligns himself with the practices
of the New Science when he suggests that it was curiosity — his desire “to
know what is forbidden and denied me” — that made him, he says, take off his
blindfold mid-flight (Cervantes 731).2
When Sancho gives his account of his “observations” of and from the
moon, he invokes contemporary reaction to what scientists such as Galileo
reported having seen through their telescopes. Listening to Sancho’s com
pletely unexpected account of how he “discovered the whole globe” in the sky,
Sancho’s audience responds with many of the objections that contemporaries
had to the equally startling reports of Galileo’s discoveries with the telescope.
Claiming that he took off his blindfold upon reaching the region of fire, San
cho first insists that he looked down to see an earth the size of a mustard seed
peopled by men the size of hazel nuts. The duchess challenges
“it
is clear that if the earth appeared to you like a grain of mustard seed and each
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man like a hazel nut, one man alone would have covered the whole earth” (734).
As the duchess’s complaint implicitly
the telescope shows objects at
a great distance only through a kind of distortion. Despite his protests, Sancho
concurs with the duchess since he acknowledges that his view cannot determine
how a part (hazel-nut men) is related to a larger whole (a mustard-seed plan
et).
Understanding this episode from the perspective of the telescope depends
on recognizing that Sancho’s
occurs because, unlike Quixote, he is
not a reader. Arranged by the duke and the duchess, this “adventure” begins as
an elaborate re-enactment of their readings in
The horse of brass
from Cleomadés, the hippogriff in Orlando furioso, the fantastic voyages in the
Arabian Nights, perhaps Lucian’s True History — these are among the romance
subtexts that inform the way that the duke and duchess construct this adven
ture.3 Where Quixote knows such literary subtexts intimately, Sancho responds
to the “experience” that the duke and duchess create by insisting on the truth of
his personal observations as he has experienced them through the medium of
Clavileño. Sancho thus describes how after passing the moon he left the horse
to play with the goats of the “Cabrillas” constellation (nanny goat, Pleaides).
Upon being challenged by Quixote as to the impossibility of having played with
these starry goats, Sancho substantiates his claims by describing the colors of
the goats. He avers that
saw colors in the stars — red, green, and
goats
— that were invisible to everyone else. As if in response to those who ques
tioned whether the telescope would work the same way in the supralunar realm
as it did in the sublunar one, Sancho transforms this challenge to his experi
ence’s observational validity into an improbable if irrefutable defense of his fan
tastic story.
In this episode Cervantes ultimately refuses to resolve the conflict between
observation and reading brought about by the new technology of the telescope.
Although this story invokes the telescope only as a subtext, it is consistent with
how the telescope entered the European imagination.4 Seizing upon its fan
tastic qualities, both critics and admirers of the telescope imagined its power in
texts that dramatized the utopian possibilities it seemed to represent. As with
Sancho’s magical ride, the telescope was
with the “Utopian dream”
that Carlos Fuentes describes in his introduction to Don Quixote, because it was
instrument of distant vision. Insofar as the telescope was often credited with
remarkable powers, it is unsurprising that it would be incorporated into a
that in some sense made it possible better to see this world by refracting it
through images of a distant world: the utopia.5 What the telescope and the
utopia share is not simply a powerfully distorted image of the world, since what
the utopia attempts as a genre is significantly more than just a fantastic imag
ining of the unattainable.6 As Fredric Jameson has demonstrated, utopias are
structured to put two conflicting possibilities in relation to one another as a way
of working out otherwise unresolvable cultural problems. If critics have noticed
the prominence of utopia as a genre in works that deal topically with the inven
tion of the telescope, then it is because these utopian fictions themselves con
stitute what Jameson identifies as a “process” that explores the conflict between
reading and experience associated with the telescope as a new way of seeing
(81).
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In a provocative reassessment of the way that the early modern utopia
develops, Marina Leslie has recently argued that utopias are neither "straight
forward social blueprint” nor fixed literary genre but rather “a complex textual
practice enmeshed in a web of historical contingencies” (1). She thus argues for
the need “to consider utopia as a kind of edgy, multiple, and palimpsestic way
of reading (2; emphasis added).7 In this essay I would like to extend Leslies
argument by in some sense inverting it. As recent work in textual studies and
the history of the book has begun to make clear, reading is a contested activity
in this period and, as such, reading as a means to knowledge comes at times
be perceived as
almost unrealizable ideal. Though not usually seen as linked
texts, Johannes Kepler’s Dream (1634) and Margaret Cavendish’s Description of
a New World Called the Blazing World (1666) represent two compelling exam
ples of how an emphasis on observation and experimentation makes reading
problematic in the context of early modern scientific
These two
utopias do not just give readers
of the new technology; they also make
the methods of the new technology a part of the reader’s experience of the text.
Keplers Dream is a description of how the earth is perceived from the perspec
tive of the moon. This alternative view of earth is then set inside an elaborate
fairy tale frame narrative and annotated with hundreds of footnotes.
Cavendish’s Blazing World describes the voyages of a protagonist who somehow
escapes into an alternative realm where her experiences with scientific
tion become a means for looking back at the earth. Kepler and Cavendish fol
low the practice of earlier utopias in using an elaborate frame narrative as a
structure that separates the reader from whatever ideal world is being imagined.
Both texts thus show how the frame is therefore both a means of access to an
imagined ideal and a barrier ever realizing
Reading is in most early modern utopias not unlike the bridge across the
river Andydrus in Thomas More’s Utopia: although we may never know how
long it is or precisely how it gets us closer to Utopia, it nonetheless allows us
reach, however tentatively, impossible ideals through imaginative self-projec
tion (Marin, “Toward a Semiotic” 266; More 5). It is in this context that Peter
Ruppert thus speaks of utopias as “tentative and provisional explorations” that
only achieve a “dynamic process of discovery” through the active engagement of
the reader (23-4). The insistence on texts as physical artifacts (see, for instance,
the Aldine Press editions in the Utopia) thus emphasizes how reading provides
key access to these otherwise unapproachable imaginative territories. For
Kepler and Cavendish, reading is considerably more important and yet also
considerably more vexed, since in their texts the frame narrative becomes a kind
of meditation on the act of reading in which we are engaged. Depicting read
ing as instances of distortion, delusion, and dream through an association with
the telescope, the frame in these utopias becomes a narrative realization of the
act of reading. Understanding the ways in which reading involves a kind of dis
tortion comparable to that of the telescope, Kepler and Cavendish construct
their utopias as a
of creating, albeit in fictional form, a site/sight where
reading theory and observational practice can be imagined if not realized. Aug
menting recent work in the history of early modern reading practices, this essay
considers these practices as they were theorized by
and Cavendish
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themselves. For
and Cavendish, reading is not so much the way to
utopian ideal as it is that ideal.
The manner in which these two texts are utopias about reading can be seen
in how they
published. Kepler’s Dream was published jointly with his
translation into Latin of Plutarchs Defacie orbe lunae.8 Cavendish’s Blazing
World was likewise published jointly with her Observations Upon Experimental
Philosophy. Kepler translates — and sometimes mistranslates — Plutarch as
part of an ongoing attempt to reconcile a traditional understanding of reading
with new practices in science. Kepler rereads the most self-consciously fictive
parts of his classical sources to transform them into scientifically relevant doc
uments. The Dream uses the utopia as a genre to integrate the ways of reading
that Kepler associates with Plutarch,
and Lucian into the new kinds of
knowledge being discovered through the telescope. If Kepler used the Dream
to reconcile humanistic reading practices with his
Margaret
Cavendish sought in the Blazing World to accommodate her readings of recent
scientific texts to
understanding of herself as a writer. Cavendish’s utopia
examines what it means to read contemporary works in natural philosophy —
and in particular those that claim to exemplify the “New Philosophy” that she
associated with experimentalism. By publishing these texts together with their
utopias, Kepler and Cavendish depict how the practice of reading becomes
complicated by new visual technologies.

Johannes Kepler’s Dream was the first fictional work to see the earth from a
specifically Copernican perspective.9 Kepler did not conceive of the Dream as
"proof” of the Copernican hypothesis, since he never seems to have truly
doubted it. Rather, the Dream is an argument for the Copernican hypothesis
that nostalgically projects a utopian world in which seeing and knowing were
joined as they apparently had been in the pre-Copernican world. Despite the
fact that Kepler claimed that the purpose of the Dream was "to use the exam
ple of the moon, to build up an argument in favor of the motion of the earth”
(36), the work was of comparatively little scientific importance. Critical dis
cussions of the Dream have generally separated Kepler’s presentation of
sci
entific
at the center of the text from the complex textual apparatus that
surrounds
Kepler’s readers have thus emphasized the scientific accuracy of
his representation of what the earth would look like without recognizing that
Kepler is also indulging in a fantasy world in which mediation and distortion
would not interfere with what we see and know (Nicolson, "Kepler” 276-7;
Manuel and Manuel 212; Lane vii). Understood in this context, Kepler’s fan
tasy about unproblematic knowledge works as a kind of solution to the
lenges set out in the frame narrative.
Kepler seeks this solution not only as a scientist but as a reader. As has
often been
the final form of the Dream stands as a correction to mis
readings of earlier versions of the text that had led to witchcraft charges being
brought against Kepler’s mother.10 Actually, though, Kepler’s attempt
amend earlier readings of his text became over the course of a number of years
part of a larger attempt to develop a theory that reflected upon the reading
practices that informed
scientific work. For if Kepler is best known for his
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use of observational data to construct new star charts and tables, it should also
be remembered that it was Tycho Brahe, not Kepler, who did the observing. As
a scientific observer, therefore, Kepler was also a reader. As Anthony Grafton
points out, Kepler relied on written descriptions from other astronomers as a
kind of visual aid for
observational work. He thus used Cardanos "crisp,
well-chosen adjectives to compensate for weakness of his own eyesight . . .
seeing] what a comet’s tail actually looked like” ("Kepler”
More general
ly, Kepler’s work testifies to an active and wide-ranging use of classical sources.
J. V. Field demonstrates in this context how the importance that reading had
for Kepler has become an impediment to subsequent attempts to understand
his work. Kepler’s commentaries on his own work thus reread both classical
authorities and his own earlier writings (Field 163-7,172-6).
Grafton con
cludes, while new scientific practices may have changed the
in which read
ing was discussed, it nonetheless remained the model for "all complex forms of
learning” ("Kepler” 565).
’s work as a whole demonstrates in this context
"how much the
of reading meant to him” (563).11 Kepler theorizes in the
Dream the interest in reading that Grafton identifies as being characteristic of
the early modern period as a whole. The questions about reading and observ
ing that structure Kepler’s more strictly scientific
become the narrative
subject of the Dream. Kepler keeps returning to this otherwise intellectually
insignificant text — revising, restructuring, explaining, adding notes to the
notes — because it gives him a way to think through in narrative form
own
scientific practices.
In contrast to the scientific texts that Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer
have described as transforming
modern readers into vicarious observers,
readers of the Dream are not observers.12 Kepler initially uses the fictional
form precisely
he wants to describe something that no one —
mat
ter how good the telescope — could see from earth. The literal separation of
reader from observer is prominent in a letter that
wrote to Paul Guldin,
which is included in a "selenographical appendix” at the end of the published
version of the Dream. Kepler’s letter thanks Guldin for giving him a telescope
and presents him with a copy of the Dream, suggesting that the text will be a
compensation for the telescope. Kepler is not simply employing the rhetoric of
courtly patronage; he intends his remarks literally, saying that

Since you are the first from whom I hear that this treasure [the telescope]
is to pass into my possession, you are also the first to whom I think I should
offer some fruit of literary enjoyment. ... If you direct your mind to the
towns on the moon, I shall prove to you that I see them. (150-1)

Having just given Kepler the astronomical tool that would have allowed him to
"direct” his eyes to find proof of these new observations, Guldin can only see
through his imagination. What is true for Guldin is also true for other con
temporary readers of the Dream: they must use their imaginations since it is
not
for anyone — with or without a telescope — to see what the earth
looks like from the moon.
Kepler therefore constructs this text so that it is in some sense a dream
about reading and observation. One day, after reading about the legendary his
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tory of Bohemia, the narrator falls asleep and dreams that he is reading a book
about a man named Duracotus. A fictional version of Kepler, Duracotus is able
to learn about the moon and stars through the discoveries and revelations of a
daemon spirit who shows him a
of Levania (the moon) that comprises
the central part of the text. If Kepler is reading at the outset of the narrative,
he is also involved in "watching the stars and the moon” (11). Yet, even as
Kepler invokes these two methods of acquiring
he rejects them as
insufficient insofar as it is through a dream that he has his vision of the moon.
His dream in turn replicates these conflicting acts of observation and reading.
In dreaming that he is reading yet another book — one obtained at the Frank
furt book fair —
reminds his readers that this book fair was the best
source for new scientific books that were innovative,
or even cen
sored.13 Yet, at the
time, this dream about reading is itself presented as a
kind of astronomical observation: the dream begins with the drowsiness
brought on by a late night watching stars and ends with a storm that would
have made astronomical observations as well as astronomical dreams impossi
ble (11, 28).
Like Keplers narrative, Duracotus is associated with forms of reading and
observation that define contemporary scientific practice. Duracotus learns not
just Danish but modern methods of science when he studies with the
astronomer Tycho Brahe at his observatory complex on Hven. In the Dream,
Uraniborg is represented as a
that combines modern observational tech
niques with modern reading practices. As Kepler knew from having served as
Brahes assistant at Uraniborg, Brahe had an enormous, room-sized brass quad
rant affixed to the wall that became a key tool in the "highly precise method of
observation” with which Brahe "fought against the very nature of human vision
and emerged victorious” (47 n.
Yet, as Kepler suggests, studies at Urani
borg also emphasized reading along with observation: Brahe had an extensive
library collection, a paper mill, and a printing press.14 Duracotus has thus
learned both by using new observational tools and by reading books: "things
which you saw with your own eyes or learned by hearsay or absorbed from
books” (14). Uraniborg
in the frame narrative as the best attempt
bring together reading and observation as the two dominant means of acquir
ing new scientific knowledge. Kepler suggests in this reflection on Uraniborg
that even Brahe's dream could not, in this world, be fully achieved: despite his
training, Duracotus does not "acquire new knowledge” through the methods
taught at Uraniborg but through the
from the daemon, whom Kepler
associates with knowledge. The purpose of Kepler's elaborate frame narrative,
then, is to portray the acts of reading and observation as important but finally
never adequate means of acquiring knowledge.
In his copious footnotes, Kepler addresses his
to different kinds of
. He names particular individuals; he addresses readers of his earlier
works; he imagines that spectators who had observed his astronomical demon
strations are now reading this work (39 n. 8; 108 n. 154; 57 nn. 44, 46, 47).
Often employing the imperative, Kepler repeatedly gives his readers instruc
tions on how to read his Dream: "Interpret this physically” (64 n. 57); "Refer
back to Note 28” (49 n. 31); "You who are annoyed, forgive me” (65 n. 59). In
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so doing, Kepler’s footnotes inscribe the figure of the reader into the text as he
both anticipates and tries to script the
of his readers. At the same
time, Kepler is in the notes also his own best reader. As a record of Kepler’s
different and changing interpretations of his own work, the notes exemplify the
range of his reading practices. Kepler at times reads his Dream as an allegory
in a manner in keeping with the hermeneutics of medieval theology; he demon
strates his familiarity with the reading practices of humanist philology by gloss
ing his text with notes on relevant scholarly literature; elsewhere he provides
scientific explanation and interpretation more characteristic of the New Sci
ence. In this context, Kepler’s notes to the text likewise problematize the rela
tionship between reading and observing. When he discusses the origin of the
Dream, Kepler insists that his work preceded both observational studies and his
reading in classical sources. Thus, at the outset, Kepler describes how “exceed
ingly amazed” he was that his ideas corresponded so closely with Plutarch’s
“because they did not at all come to me from reading this book” (32 n.
In
discussing the mountains on the moon — one of the most famous conclusions
of The Starry Messenger — Kepler similarly insists that “this detail of the Dream
is older than the Dutch telescope” (125 n. 207). At these moments Kepler
seems to participate in a positivistic view of his own scientific
Yet,
Kepler’s text elsewhere gives other, conflicting accounts for the sources of his
ideas.15 What is important is finally not where Kepler got his
but that his
notes reproduce the structure of the
in suggesting that knowledge does
not come from either reading or observing.
As the frame narrative to the Dream suggests, Kepler shares with
Cavendish a recognition of the limitations to both reading and observation in
the practice of science. Since Copemicanism makes it clear that man is not the
measure of his universe, Kepler imagines in Levania a world and a people who
are the measure of their universe. Kepler thus depicts the inhabitants of Leva
nia as a fantastic consequence of the physical reality of their world: having both
a “monstrous size” and a “short lifespan,” the physical being of these creatures
is in keeping with the astronomical circumstances of their world (27).16
emphasizes how man is neither the measure of his world nor physically suited
to apprehend other worlds. With a darkness uncharacteristic of imaginary voy
ages during this period, Kepler
in detail how those who investigate
this world will suffer pain until they are almost “torn to pieces” (71 n. 68). The
Levanians by contrast realize a relationship to their physical environment that
allows them direct and unmediated access to knowledge. They need neither
books nor telescopes to know their world. Even as Kepler purports to be
demonstrating the Copernican theory, he represents the Levanian world
through a pre-Copernican understanding of man.
Where the frame narrative identifies a conflict between observation and
reading as the key problem of modern knowledge, the utopia at the heart of the
narrative imagines a world that reconciles this conflict through its physical real
ity. The utopian central section inverts the normal situation in which we make
claims about the earth based on our observations of the moon. Kepler asks us
instead to imagine being on the moon while looking back at the earth. In try
ing to portray what the earth looks like from the moon, Kepler renames these
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celestial bodies to accord with the way this change in perspective also alters how
they appear to observers. The moon that we see primarily as white (lebhana,
luna, selene, selas) becomes Levania, while the earth that they perceive as rotat
ing is the Volva (volere) (78 nn. 89, 90). As we have seen, Levania's lunar world
is one where knowledge is
from evidence that is clearly and continual
ly visible to an eye unaided by the telescope:
is knowing. The most
remarkable feature of the Levanian landscape is that the earth — four times as
large as the moon — can always be
in the sky. It is, the daemon says,
"always visible . . . fixed in place, then, as though it
attached to the heav
ens with a nail” (22). Because the Volva appears to Levanians as if it were four
times the size of their own globe, the Volva’s "size and brilliance ... is practi
cally never hidden, even at new Volva.” As a result, this world
a natural
solution to two of the most pressing epistemological problems of the seven
teenth century: telling time and determining the longitude. The Volva thus
becomes a visible celestial manifestation of the truth.
Consequently, Kepler’s Dream can describe a world in which knowledge is
based on direct observation in a
that is not physically possible on earth.17
The constancy of the Volva allows the Levanians to determine both the hour
and their location simply by looking up at the sky. What Kepler’s original read
ers would have recognized immediately is that the Levanian world solves the
problem of how to keep time and determine longitude. As the work of David
Landes suggests, this was a serious problem in the seventeenth century (Lan
des 84,132,145; Howse 2-54). In his Learned Treatise of Globes (1639), Robert
Hues complained that through sailors’ ignorance of how to calculate latitude

there have been many errors committed in navigation, and many whole
countries also removed out of their owne proper situation, and translated
into places of others. (169)
Although the miscalculations of ships on such north-south passages were rela
to
in comparison toreference
those made on east-west voyages, errors occurred
ly fewcreate
because there was no reliable
to make such calculations. Since at least the
time of Ptolemy’s Geography it had been known that calculating longitude
entailed comparing the time in different parts of the globe.18 The different
proposals for doing this were all predicated upon one of two assumptions about
the earth’s position in the universe or, more particularly, about man’s ability
find some fixed point of
to the universe. The first group sought
find or
a reference point inside the boundaries of the planet. Peter and
Phillip Apian, Guillaume de Nautonier, and even the mad Mathematician of
Cervantes’s El coloquio de los perros located this standard of measure within the
earth itself when they looked for declination from the magnetic pole. After it
was realized that the ore content of mountains and other large land masses
made standard declination impossible, two British mathematicians suggested
that a series of "fixed points” be artificially constructed on the surface of the
earth. In this proposal lamented by Dr. Arbuthnot as having "spoiled one of my
papers of Scribelerus, which was a proposal for the longitude not very unlike,”
William Whiston and Humphrey Ditton suggested that vessels moored at
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intervals along travel routes should shoot off flares each night at midnight,
according to Peak of Tenerife time.19 Gemma Frisius, William Cunningham,
and proponents of the chronometer method gave man the power to create such
a point of reference with what Cunningham calls the "parfaite clocke artificial-ly made” — a perfectly sound plan that was just not yet feasible (110).
Each of these methods essentially sought to dissociate time-telling from
reliance on non- or supra-terrestrial phenomena and, in doing so, to
a
self-contained, self-referential earth. The second, more popular solution the
longitude question sought a point of
outside the boundaries of the
earth in the form of predictable
phenomena that could be observed and
recorded at different points on the globe simultaneously. In this model, the
skies themselves became a kind of clock. These methods calculated longitude
by observing the relative positions of different-celestial bodies: the moon to the
sun (Ptolemy’s lunar eclipse method), Jupiters satellites to Jupiter (Galileo’s
planetary eclipse method), or the moon to the fixed stars (Johann Werner’s
lunar distance method). In relying on phenomena that were in some way dif
ficult to observe, such methods were, as Kepler concludes, "very laborious and
uncertain” (98).
Kepler’s utopia circumvents the impediments to knowledge on earth
because the monstrous size of Volva ensures that for the Levanians time is
always known. Where most observers after Galileo looked at the moon’s spots
as evidence of its changing nature, Kepler directs
readers’ attention to a
comparable progression of spots visible on the earth itself.20 Not indications of
inconstancy, these spots instead mark the passing of time.

Volva itself also distinguishes the hours for them. For even though it does
not
to have
motion in space, nevertheless, unlike our moon, it
rotates in its place and displays in turn a wonderful variety of spots.... This
is the only uniform measure of time. (23)
The panoramic succession of
produced by the Volva’s rotation is plain
ly visible to the naked eye — a man (Africa) seems repeatedly to be kissing a
girl (Europe) in a long dress (eastern Europe, the Baltic regions), who stretch
es back her hand (England) to catch a leaping cat (Scandinavia). No special
knowledge of star movements or calculations is necessary: most simply, each
new attempt by the man to kiss the girl
the passage of another hour. The
story that the Levanians see in the sky makes the same demand of its viewers
that Sancho Panza makes on his audience when he tells Don Quixote his goat
story: you must keep count for the story to work (Cervantes 152-4). Unlike
the progression of the fixed stars across the sky, the spots mark intervals, not
sequence. The dial, the fixed point behind the moving hands, is not in some
distant sphere. In contrast to seventeenth-century solutions to the longitude
problem, Kepler’s watching Levanians themselves take the place of the fixed
dial. Neither a rigorous prerequisite to observation nor a laborious calculation
to be drawn from it, knowledge depends upon the presence of a viewer to keep
count of the passing hours. Requiring neither telescopes nor books to know
their world, the Levanians enjoy the "measure” no longer possible in Kepler’s
post-Copernican astronomy.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol3/iss2/4

any

10



Spiller: Sighting Utopia in the Lens: Reading Praxis in Johannes Kepler an

Elizabeth A. Spiller

157

Although Kepler’s description of Levania appears in many ways to be
objectively and scientifically accurate, he suppresses details that do not support
his fantasy. For instance, facts that do not support a radical connection between
seeing and knowing are never mentioned. The text does not acknowledge that
finding the latitude on Levania would be nearly as difficult as finding the lon
gitude is on earth. Kepler obscures the latitude problem by mentioning it only
in the context of the “convenience” of determining longitude on Levania:

they indicate the longitude of places with reference to their motionless
Volva, and the latitude with reference both to Volva and to. the poles,
whereas for longitudes
have nothing but the lowly declination of the
magnet. (22)
Although the comparison between the earth’s longitude and Levania’s latitude
goes unremarked in this passage, the opposite connection between the earth’s
latitude and Levania’s longitude is insisted upon elsewhere in the Dream pre
cisely because it can be assimilated into the model of visible knowledge. In this
respect, Kepler compares the Volva’s presence on the horizon to “the greater and
smaller altitudes of the pole, even though we do not see the pole with our own
eyes.” For a sailor or astronomer, the most logical terrestrial analogue to the
Volva’s “always visible” presence on the Levanian horizon would be the star
Polaris at the North Pole. Since Polaris is a real and visible natural body, it pro
vides information about location to the inhabitants of earth in much the same
that the Volva would on the moon. Instead of discussing the Pole star,
however, Kepler’s narrative emphasizes the Pole, an abstract (and invisible) con
cept. In making this choice, the Dream again suggests that the Levanian world
can be apprehended immediately and intuitively in ways that the sublunar one
cannot. Ultimately, the Dream is a utopia that admits the physically necessary
limitations to human knowledge in order to project a world and place that does
not have such limitations.

In her Observations upon Experimental Philosophy
Margaret Cavendish
up the philosophical problem raised in the Dream by arguing that tele
scopes, microscopes and other tools of observation constitute only “deluding
Glasses” and “Experiments.” She asserts that “[s]ense deludes more than it
gives a true Information, and an exterior inspection through an Optick glass, is
so deceiving, that it cannot be relied upon” (sig. dl). Where a text with this title
might in this period ordinarily be expected to document trials, demonstrations,
or “experiences,” Cavendish’s Observations is instead a rejection of the scientif
ic practices exemplified by such work. The full force of Cavendish’s critique of
experimental and observational science only becomes apparent when read
through her utopian rethinking of contemporary scientific practice in the Blaz
ing World. Cavendish chooses to append the Observations to the Blazing World
to establish experimentalism as the context for her fictional work. Rejecting
the science of observation in favor of the imagination of readers, the Blazing
World makes experimentalism the site for its utopia about fiction and the nature
of reading.
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In this respect, Cavendish’s utopia is the culmination of a line of inquiry
begun with her first scientific work, Philosophical Fancies (1653).
subse
quently revised this work as the Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1655,
1663), a much more fully realized response to her reading in recent works in
natural philosophy. In these subsequent editions, Cavendish responds to what
she has been reading in Hobbes, Descartes, More, and Van Helmont. The
somewhat ironically entitled Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy offers
a critique of the scientific practices that she associated with Robert Hooke’s
Micrographia
Hobbes’s work on optics, and Robert Boyle’s Experiments
Touching Colours (1664). Although it is difficult in many
to delineate
the development of Cavendish’s intellectual opinions in these works, it is clear
that her attitude towards the practice of science in this period
as a
result of her experiences as a reader of science. Speaking of her husband as her
“only tutor” and herself as “unlearned,” Cavendish describes how after the pub
lication of her first
she “applied [her] self to the reading of Philosophi
cal Authors, of purpose to learn those names and words of Art that are used in
Schools” (Cavendish, Life sig. a3r).
became a reader so that she
become part of the ongoing intellectual debates that interested her. Presenting
herself as one who wrote as a reader, Cavendish in the early editions of the
Philosophical and Physical Opinions used her status as a reader of recent works by
Hobbes, Descartes, and van Helmont to authorize her writing. In the Obser
vations and the Blazing World, Cavendish’s rejection of recent work in experimentalism and optics is predicated in part upon her earlier attempt to take part,
if only as a reader, in contemporary scientific debate. Here she writes as some
one who will not be read in order to reject reading as it was being defined in
the works of experimental philosophers.
a fictional response to her readings in the New Science, the Blazing
World might be understood as telling in
the history of reading as a con
tested activity in early modern science. Seeing Cavendish in this
contrasts
with the more familiar view of her as one who did not
As Cavendish rec
ognizes, experimental philosophy was the type of science that most excluded
readers like her. The problem with the New Science, for Cavendish, is not just
that it depends on “arts” — such as the telescope — that involve distortion and
delusion. Equally important, the methodology of experimentalism limits the
reader’s access to new forms of
Thus, in her joint publication of the
Observations and the utopian Blazing World, Cavendish rejects contemporary
scientific practice in favor of a utopian fantasy in which readers get to make
their own worlds. On the other hand, Cavendish’s decision to write a utopia
should not suggest that she was primarily frustrated in her isolation from con
temporary scientific thought. As recent studies demonstrate, many of Margaret
Cavendish’s scientific opinions were in themselves not that far from the main
stream of contemporary intellectual thought.21 Cavendish’s philosophical writ
ing, as she herself recognizes, is in many ways no more strange than Descartes’s
vortices, Hobbes’s materialism, or Charleton’s atomism. As Eve Keller con
cludes, it is important that we not ignore “the contemporary viability of her
own attempts at natural philosophy” (450) 22 In suggesting that what distin
guishes Cavendish is thus not so much what she
knew, or even under
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stood, recent discussions have focused on how as a woman Cavendish lacked
the authority to write on these subjects.
This argument might be extended, however, by recognizing as a more fun
damental problem that Cavendish’s works were not read because she herself
lacked the preliminary qualifications to be accepted even as a reader of scien
tific texts.23 As Shapin and Schaffer suggest, the reader became a key figure in
the development and dissemination of seventeenth-century science. Although
observations and experiments would ordinarily be considered merely “proba
ble,” affirmation from distinguished witnesses could transform what was only a
“probable” into an “accepted” truth. Readers were important in this process as
a way of multiplying witnesses to
greater consensus (Shapin and Schaf
fer 60). In this regard, Cavendish’s case demonstrates that just as there were
limitations on who qualified as an observer, there were, in ways that have not
been fully recognized, also comparable limitations on who qualified as a read
er. Margaret Cavendish is not qualified to be a true reader of these texts to the
extent that
would not have been accepted as a
witness at the demon
strations held by the Royal Society and other learned groups.24 Cavendish was
implicitly not accepted as capable of truly assenting to — let alone “confuting”
— work in contemporary science. This sense in which she was thus not recog
nized as a reader more fully explains why Cavendish’s published work received
no serious attention during the seventeenth century.25 While this claim is a
logical extension of what has been identified as Cavendish’s position in gener
al, it becomes important because Cavendish’s works — and the Blazing World
in particular — respond to her own recognition that she was not read.
Although Cavendish claimed that she did not write to
she was
clearly deeply concerned with readers’ responses to her work.26 Cavendish’s
sense of herself primarily as a reader can be seen in her attitude towards her
own
Her insistence that she wrote “to please myself rather than to
please such Crabbed Readers” who might criticize her works does not obvious
ly come out of an indifference to what readers thought.27 Cavendish’s works
almost all include elaborate prefatory epistles that seek to direct the terms
under which her work is read. The Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1663),
for instance, includes a letter from the duke of Newcastle to his wife, a second
from her to him, a letter to her “Noble Readers,” another simply “To the Read
er,” “An Epistle to the Reader,” and finally “Another Epistle to the
”
The earliest version of this text, The Philosophical Fancies
begins with
three different letters directed to three different kinds of readers. Even the
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, although more restrained in many
ways, nonetheless contains letters to the duke, to the “Most Noble, and Emi
nently-Learned” readers of Cambridge University, and to the “Courteous
Reader.”
Cavendish relies on this elaborate textual apparatus not out of ignorance
of contemporary conventions in publishing. Rather, she is also imagining,
somewhat idealistically, the possibility that her readers would in some sense
rewrite her
through their responses. Thus, in the CCXI. Sociable Letters
(1664), she responds to a writer who condemns the practice of printing letters
praising a work. She disagrees by saying that she wishes that “whereas I have

Published by eGrove, 1998

read,
an





13

valid



160

Journal X, Vol. 3 [1998], No. 2, Art. 4

Journal x

One Friend to Praise my Works, although Partially, I had a Thousand, or rather
Ten thousand Millions, nay, that their number
Infinite, that the Issue of
my Brain, Fame, and Name, might live to Eternity if it
possible” (163).
Cavendish is here indirectly defending her practice — which she began after
critics suggested of her early works that they must have been written by some
one else — of including such a letter of praise from her husband in almost every
book she published.28 At the same time, Cavendish is also supposing that she
might have "infinite” millions of readers who would write to praise her works.
Even as she imagines that she will be able to create readers through her writ
ing, she also hopes that such readers would be able to create her through their
reading. Thus, Cavendish’s interest in reaching readers is not so much the
expression of an egocentric desire for fame as it is a recognition of how central
her own experiences as a reader were in defining — as well as limiting — her
understanding of the world.
Where
writes from the perspective of a scientist trying to commu
nicate a kind of imaginative observational experience to readers, Cavendish
responds as a reader who was unable to obtain the "truth” from the observa
tional accounts of writers such as Robert Hooke. Understood from Cavendish’s
perspective, a text such as Hooke’s Micrographia limited the reader in the sense
that a reader
only ever see as much as the illustrations showed. The very
elaborateness — the microscopic realism — of the engravings merely empha
sizes that the text becomes a substitute for, rather than an encouragement to,
experience itself. Thus, Cavendish constructs the Blazing World to redefine the
access that her readers have to the "truth” of her text.
Cavendish employs a frame narrative to create a transition into a world in
which her autobiographical character is allowed to reign over the scientific soci
ety from which the author was excluded. The Blazing World therefore begins
in a romance world with a young man "travelling into a foreign Country,” and
falling "extremely in
with a young Lady” (1). The young man determines
to pursue his love by kidnapping her, but his boat is lost in a storm. When the
boat passes through the North Pole into another world called the Blazing
World, only the lady survives. The lady’s marriage to the emperor of this new
world allows her to establish a group of learned societies, which become the
vehicle for both a critique of experimental science and a demonstration of the
methodological superiority of what Cavendish referred to as "rational thought.”
In debates that ironize proceedings at the Royal Society, representatives of dif
ferent societies are repeatedly forced to admit that they cannot answer the
empress’s questions because they cannot see something. Astronomers cannot
determine what air is because they cannot see it (22); chemists do not know
whether all
have circulatory systems because these interior motions are
not visible "neither of themselves, nor by the help of
optick instrument”
(35); natural philosophers are unable to observe "the interior, corporeal
motions” of vegetables and minerals (41). In the same
that Cavendish
addresses her Observations upon Experimental Philosophy to what she refers to as
"Modern Experimentall and Dioptrical Writers,” Cavendish
mentions the
experimental philosophers and the astronomers both first and at greatest
length. Together, these two methods of scientific inquiry epitomize what is for
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Cavendish the greatest weakness of contemporary science:
upon visu
al evidence.
In establishing the boundaries of her fictional world, Cavendish thus uses
astronomy in ways that challenge its reliance upon unverifiable visual evidence.
In particular, reading into the frame of her narrative world evokes the act of
looking through a telescope. At the beginning of the narrative when the lady
first crosses from her world into the Blazing World, Cavendish addresses the
reader directly for the first and only time to explain the peculiar twinned plan
ets and their relationship to our world:
least you should scruple at it, and think, if it were thus, those that Eve at the
Poles would either see two Suns at one time, else they would
want
the
light for six months together, as it is commonly believed; You must
know, that
of these Worlds having its own Sun to enlighten it, they
move each
in their peculiar circles; which motion is so just and exact,
that neither can hinder or obstruct the other; for they do not exceed their
Tropicks, and although they should meet, yet we in this world cannot so well
perceive them, by reason of the brightness of our Sun, which being nearer to
us, obstructs the splendor of the Suns of the other Worlds, they being toofar
off to be discerned by our optick perception, except we use very good Telescopes, by
which skilful Astronomers have often observed two or three Suns at once, (3;
emphasis added)

It is precisely at this point that a new world opens up in Cavendish’s text. This
new world is not the Blazing World, an alternative realm that readers would
have anticipated from Cavendish’s title. Instead, the unexpectedly new world
in Cavendish’s text is the lady’s native world: before this point there is nothing
in the text to indicate that her world is not our world. Prior to this, the term
"world” is only used once in the opening
and is preceded by a definite
article. Here, suddenly, the text moves directly from the expected, generic
romance alternation between actual and ideal to a more complicated division
that now includes the Blazing World as a third realm.
Cavendish’s description of the complicated physical relationships between
the three planets is ostensibly an assertion of the plausibility of her narrative
world. Yet, it is not improbable planetary motions that are a problem; at issue
rather is
ability to know anything about such a world. Cavendish’s sugges
tion that the worlds she describes are real but not visible "except we use very
good Telescopes” initially situates this utopia just beyond the range of unaided
vision. Science — the knowledge of "skilful Astronomers” — appears to pro
vide the most certain access to and confirmation of her fictional
The
conclusion that these astronomers may see these worlds in the
way that
they see "two or three suns at once,” however, reduces their claims to the status
of optical
What science can attest to is no more than a disappearing
parahelion. Even as the frame narrative models reading on the act of looking
through the telescope, Cavendish insists that it is not astronomers with tele
scopes but instead "skillful” readers with
who will be able to discover this
strange new world.
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Like Kepler, Cavendish intends the reader to see things which would not
be visible in any lens. This contrasts with most literary writers who responded
to the new visual technology by using their texts to show readers — if often
parodically — what you
see through the telescope. John Donne thus
imagines that Galileo is able to bring the moon to the earth in Ignatius, his Con
clave (1611), while Francis Godwin’s Man in the Moone (1638) depicts a world
of people ten, twenty, and thirty times larger than life. Where Donne and
Godwin mimic the function of the telescope, Cavendish uses her narrative to
show readers worlds that the telescope’s augmented vision occludes.
Cavendish’s intention of showing
a world that exceeds new technolo
gies of vision can be seen in the inhabitants of this world:

the men . . .
of several Complexions: not white, black, tawny, oliveor ash-coloured; but some appear’d of an Azure, some of a deep Purple,
some of a Grass-green, some of a Scarlet, some of an Orange-colour, & c.
(14-15)
Vividly and visibly outside the monochrome range of “white, black, tawny,
olive- or ash-coloured,” the people of this world are truly a people of color.
Tempting as it may
however, it would be a mistake to understand
Cavendish’s depiction of the “several complexions” of this world as an attempt
to reconceptualize contemporary understandings of racial identity, or even, as
Rosemary Kegl suggests, as evidence of “the flexibility of race as a category dur
ing the seventeenth century” (135).
In this description of the people of the Blazing World, Cavendish is reread
ing her own fiction through an understanding of discovery provided by her
rejection of the telescope. In Cavendish’s early prose romance, “Assaulted and
Pursued Chastity” (1656), the heroine Travellia/Affectionata finds herself in a
distant and strange

they in the boat never saw such complexioned men, for they
not black
like Negroes, nor tawny, nor olive, nor ash-coloured, as many are, but of a
deep purple; their hair as white as milk, and like wool; their lips thin, their
ears long, their noses flat, yet sharp, their teeth and nails as black as jet and
as shining.... All those of royal blood were of a perfect orange colour, their
hair coal black, their teeth and nails as white as milk. (63, 68)
In this earlier story, a contemporary fascination with ethnography informs
Cavendish’s belief in natural hierarchy. As someone who supported sumptuary
laws that would make social standing physically visible to all, Cavendish here
postulates a race in which class would be marked not by clothing but by skin
color. When Cavendish rewrites this passage in the Blazing World, however, a
different understanding of what it means to be able to know things by seeing
them leads her to imagine not
colors of people but a whole rainbow: azure,
purple, green, scarlet, and orange. More spectacular than anything produced in
Boyle’s Experiments Touching Colours, the people of this world refract the
spectrum of visible light.
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Throughout the Blazing World the power and majesty of the realm derive
from the range of color in the people and the whole colored world itself. Thus,
a special sort of diamonds that sparkle with the spectrum of light becomes an
icon of the empress’s power over her subjects: the Imperial State room is made
of diamonds that “seemd just like so many Rainbows” (12) and her buckler of
office “shewed like a Rainbow” (14). For Cavendish, these colors are produced
by natural vision; although optic devices such as the telescope might augment
vision in some respects, they limit the range of visible color to a monochrome.
Where earlier telescopes allow astronomers to see the Blazing World only as an
illusory parahelion, now in its inability to show more than a monochrome, the
telescope misses the magnitude and power of this “Blazing” world. In its very
vividness, the Blazing World becomes something that cannot be seen through
the artificial, and hence limited, means of the telescope.
Towards the end of the fiction, Cavendish herself recognizes the ways in
which she is rejecting not just experimental and observational science but the
ways of reading that they imply. In
episode involving the empress’s
of scribes, Cavendish reimagines the events that led to the writing of this book.
The empress decides that she needs a scribe to assist with her intellectual pro
jects. She first hopes to enlist “the Soul of some ancient famous Writer; either
of Aristotle, Pythagoras, Plato, Epicurus, or the like” (89). In order to suggest
that these philosophers are no longer relevant to the New Science, Cavendish
has the empress’s guiding spirits inform her that these “learned, subtle, and
ingenious Writers” were too sure of their own opinions to “have the patience to
be
” From the ancients she then turns to “
of the most
mod
ern Writers, as either of Galileo, Gassendus, Des Cartes, Helmont, Hobbes,
More, & ” If the classical philosophers have been excluded
of their
ancient opinions, the empress is excluded because of these “fine ingenious writ
ers” are so “self-conceited that they would scorn to be scribes to a woman.” In
this moment Cavendish asks us to think about what it would mean if Galileo
or Hobbes, for instance, had not been too “self-conceited” to write for a woman.
If other scientists had been willing to write to and for her, Cavendish implies,
then she would not have had to write the Blazing World. These authorities are
invoked only to be rejected as
characters
this is the point at
which Margaret Cavendish enters her own text as a character: she becomes the
self-writing character. Although critics have noted how Cavendish’s fictional
works almost always include some autobiographical version of herself, the Blaz
ing World is distinctive in having two different autobiographical versions of
Cavendish. Where the empress constitutes
autobiographical reflection of
Cavendish as a reader of science, Cavendish introduces herself under her own
name in this moment as the writer of an utopian science.
While Cavendish rejects the science that she associated with the Royal
Society as the basis for knowledge at the outset of the Blazing World, she sub
sequently suggests that it can play a role in society. In the Observations,
Cavendish characterizes the work of experimentalists and others not as science
but as forms of art. By relying on
microscopes, “and the like inspec
tions,” this type of science produces illusions (sig. b2). After rejecting science
as the basis of knowledge at the beginning of the Blazing World, Cavendish
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subsequently suggests in the central section of the text that the "arts” of science
can be important in theology and politics, an assertion that is needless to say in
direct contradiction to the claims of the Royal Society to remove itself from any
involvement in either of those areas.29 After first reforming
then dissolv
ing her scientific societies, Cavendish’s empress turns her attention to the social
circumstances of the state. Although she has rejected the scientists’ claim to
knowledge, the empress now uses their assistance to create two central chapels,
representing heaven and the other hell. In these temples, the “art” that
made science an inadequate means of knowledge in the Observations is exploit
ed to create spectacles “so artificially contrived” to delude the ignorant people
(62). Science cannot produce truth for Cavendish, but it can create “deluding”
shows that are powerful enough to
“a constant belief” (63).
By setting the Blazing World in opposition to the new worlds being discov
ered by natural philosophers, Cavendish seems
present a radical choice
between being a reader and being a scientist. Kepler, however, wants to inte
grate old reading practices with new observational methods. His utopian
ture is to recognize the conflict in that desire and thus to imagine a world in
which neither reading nor observation is necessary. Even as Kepler’s utopia
looks back to a pre-Copernican certainty, Cavendish’s Blazing World imagines
a realm in which anyone can create her own theory of how the world works. In
this respect, she embraces uncertainty
rejecting the dogmatism and institu
tionalization that she associates with scientific authority. In the end, though,
Cavendish likewise imagines a world in which there would be no need to jus
tify empirically one’s scientific visions. If neither of these utopias solve the con
flict between reading and observation that each identifies, their failures are not
of the imagination. Rather, Kepler and Cavendish attest the need to produce a
theory of knowledge that could also produce new theories of reading.

Notes
1. In his elegant and consistently illuminating introduction to Don Quixote,
Fuentes makes a similar point when he discusses how Sancho’s “empiricism”
cannot overcome Quixote’s unwavering belief in the truth of what and how he
reads (xviii-xix).
2. Contemporary thought was, at best, ambivalent about the moral and
theological dangers attached to scientific curiosity. For a discussion of how
astronomy and knowledge of the stars is transformed from a subject of revela
tion outside the “ ” of man into a matter of scientific inquiry, see Lewalski
46-50. Sancho’s curiosity does indeed seem to have given him significant new
ambitions in the ways that Milton’s Raphael predicts: as a result of having seen,
as he says, the comparative insignificance of the earth, Sancho declares after his
investigation into the stars that he would rather “rule the sky” than have his
long-promised island (Cervantes 736).
3. As always in Don Quixote, Cervantes is reworking a variety of texts and
topics. Sancho’s “ride” is also modelled, as he himself suggests, on the voyages
that Eugenio Torralba claimed to have taken.
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4. On the key importance that the telescope had as an informing metaphor
in the early modern period, see Blumenberg 617-74; Reiss 31-3, 54; Rorty 1113,38-51.5. Indeed, Thomas More himself seems anticipate the telescope as a utopi
an instrument in Hythlodaeus’s description of the "most expert” astronomical
knowledge of the Utopian scholars: “they have ingeniously devised instruments
in different shapes, by which they have most exactly comprehended the move
ments and the positions of the sun and moon and all the other stars which are
visible in their horizon” (More 91). Before its invention, a version of the tele
scope can of course be imagined by More as a tool of “exact” knowledge. After
ward, the telescope generally moves out of the central section of the utopia and
into the framing narrative in a way that emphasizes the problematics of the
context;See my discussion of John Donne and Francis
dge it seems to bring.
tures
Godwin below in this
one key exception is Saloman’s House in the
New Atlantis (1627).
6. Discussions of the historical development of the utopia in this period
that connect this genre to science as well as politics include, among others,
Manuel and Manuel, Reiss, Boesky, Founding Fictions, and Leslie.
7. Leslie rightly emphasizes that even aside from historical considerations
utopias are hard to fix as a literary genre because the philosophical commitment
to reform that characterizes utopian writing has as a narrative consequence a
self-conscious need to revise and rewrite earlier utopias. Nonetheless, early
modern utopias after More do seem to share certain identifying narrative fea
texts Fictions 14-17.
; 'see Boesky, Founding
hisdefine
8. Although the Dream was published posthumously, Kepler left instruc
tions that these two
were to be published together. A letter to Matthias
Bernegger suggests that he originally hoped to include with them an edition of
Lucians True History. See Romm 101.
9. On the impact that Keplers work had on literary figures such as John
Donne, Francis Godwin, John Wilkins, Cyrano de Bergerac, and John Milton,
see Nicolson, “Kepler” and “Cosmic Voyages.”
10. Originally written as a set of propositions while Kepler was a student
at Tübingen, the work subsequently was circulated in manuscript around 1608.
References to the witch Fiolxhilde resulted in witchcraft charges against his
mother. Over the next twenty five years Kepler continued to rework
man
uscript in order to correct the terrible misreading of the original manuscript: “I
therefore decided to avenge this dream of mine for the affair just cited [con
cerning his mother] by publishing the book, which will be another punishment
for my adversaries” (41 n. 8). See Nicolson, “Kepler” 260-67.
11. For two excellent
from different perspectives, of the impor
tance of reading as a practice in the development of early modern science, see
Grafton, Defenders, and Sherman 29-52, 79-100.
12. On how readers become “virtual witnesses,” see Shapin and Schaffer
60-65.
13. Galileo’s
Messenger, for example, was immediately published in
a Frankfurt edition and would almost certainly have been available at the 1611
book fair. On Kepler’s participation in the literary culture that helped
this new visual sensibility, see Grafton, “Humanism.”
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14. An illustration of the famous mural quadrant is included in Brahe’s
Astronomiae instauratae mechanica (1598). Kepler’s representation of Uraniborg
as a model of modern scientific practice differs significantly from that of
Andreas Libavius, who associated it with dark, arcane forms of knowledge. See
Hannay and the reassessment by Shakelford.
15.
See, for example, 124 n. 202; 129 n. 211, 54 n. 43.
16. Although Kepler describes early versions of his work as having associ
ated these physical characteristics of Levania and its inhabitants with its polit
structure, the revised text is careful to eliminate such potentially topical
comments (129-30 n. 213).
17. In an influential argument about the changing attitudes toward visual
perception in this period, Svetlana Alpers identifies Kepler as someone who
recognizes that distortion is inherent in any lens, whether it be the lens of the
eye or of various observational tools like the telescope. Alpers thus concludes
that Kepler defends the use of optical tools not so much by arguing for their
integrity as by demonstrating that natural vision is characterized by a similar
distortion, the “deception of vision.” As a utopia the Dream does not need to
reconcile natural and artificial observation since it imagines a world without the
falleness of man (Alpers 34-5). For two excellent accounts of the visual culture
that Kepler was influential in redefining in Northern Europe, see Kaufmann
and Ruestow.
18. The earth rotates 360 degrees/24 hours (15 degrees/hour); a time dif
ference of, say, 3 hours and 5 minutes translates into 45 degrees, 60 minutes of
longitude.
19.
Letter to Swift, 17 July 1714; quoted in Howse 49.
20. On the impact of Galileo’s claim in the Starry Messenger that he could
see that the moon was “not smooth, uniform, and precisely spherical” but rather
spotted, “full of cavities and prominences,” see Boesky, “Milton” 24.
21. For excellent rethinkings of Cavendish’s science in its contemporary
context, see Stevenson; Rogers 177-211; and Sarasohn.
22. In making this argument, Keller recognizes a key implication of Shapin
and Schaffer’s assertion that the “losers” in the history of cognition are often as
significant as the “winners.”
23. What women were expected to read was not Galileo,
instance, but
popularizations such as John Wilkins’s The Discovery of a World in the Moone
(1638). The affiliation between women readers and such popularizations is
suggested by the fact that Cavendish herself seems to have been transformed
into a central character in de Fontenelle’s A Discovery ofNew Worlds, which was
both widely read in France and quickly translated into English by Aphra Behn.
24. Cavendish’s famed visit to the Royal Society in 1667 merely proves this
point. Although she did attend the society, it was only once and only as a
tator who herself became a spectacle for Society members such as Pepys. For
accounts of this visit, see Mintz; and Grant 15-26.
25. James Fitzmaurice’s research is especially suggestive on this point: he
reports that many of the presentation copies of Cavendish’s
appear never
to have been read at all (“Margaret Cavendish” 302).
26. In important ways, Cavendish is her own first reader. Although she
claimed — and her critics have often repeated this assertion — that she
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read her own works, the evidence suggests otherwise. Fitzmaurice suggests that
Cavendish read her works with care and attention when she hand-corrected the
published volumes of her work with a clear sense of the kinds of readers she was
addressing in the different texts (see “Margaret Cavendish” and “Some Prob
lems”).
27. Cavendish, “To the Readers of my Works” in Orations, quoted in
Bowerbank 405.
28. The duke’s first letter was initially written, according to Cavendish, to
counter the rumor that someone else — a man — was the true author of her
books. William Cavendish’s letter is of course an imprimatur that relies not just
on his class or gender but more importantly on his position as the husband who
had what
recognized as a legal responsibility over his wife. As such,
William Cavendish’s letter ironically can assert that she wrote these
only
by itself claiming “authority” of and over them.
29.
See, for instance, Sprat.
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